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I. Introduction

Several years ago, I published an article about a cohort of
federal district court judges who were engaged in an
unmistakably public campaign for criminal justice reform.1
I called these judges the “‘new’ judicial activists” to signal
that they were testing the limits of the judicial role in a way
associated with the literature on judicial activism but differently from its traditional focus. That is, in addition to
occasionally using their Article III power to hold statutes or
government action invalid (the usual focus of critiques of
“judicial activism”), these judges also were urging legislative and policy changes to important aspects of criminal law
in the dicta of their opinions and in extrajudicial speech.
Some also were using their supervisory authority to promote reform, for example by creating diversionary programs that offered alternatives to incarceration. All of these
efforts reflected judges’ unwillingness to remain passive in
the face of what they perceived as injustice.
The quotes around “new” in the description signified
that it was not clear that this activity was entirely novel—
especially given that many federal judges, including district
court judges, had strenuously opposed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“guidelines”) for years after they went
into effect, through a variety of means. But it nevertheless
seemed to have increased in the decade after the Supreme
Court finally rendered the guidelines advisory in United
States v. Booker2 and to have expanded its scope, even if the
precise reasons why were elusive. However, one thing was
certain: Judge Jack Weinstein had long ago perfected the
form and seemed to have inspired the other judges, even if
indirectly, to adopt it. This essay highlights Judge Weinstein’s contributions to this style of judging, as well as his
critical engagement, in his scholarly work, with the
important questions it raises, including whether such
activity is consistent with judges’ ethical obligations. Not
surprisingly, Judge Weinstein has concluded that it is, but
he provides important guidance for other judges interested
in following his example.
II. Judicial Opinions

Judge Weinstein has in many ways reinvented the district
court judicial opinion. Judges have a great deal of discretion
in how they write their opinions, and Judge Weinstein has
taken full advantage of that space. As his biographer, Jeffrey
Morris, described the characteristics of a “Weinstein

opinion,” it often exceeds one hundred pages,3 is “graced
with scintillating prose,” and sometimes include[s] a table
of contents, photographs, and charts.”4 And that is not only
when the holding of the opinion expressly challenges precedent and courts reversal,5 as Judge Weinstein believes
district court judges have a duty to do on occasion.6 It is also
true of opinions in which he applies prevailing law but
argues in dicta that the law should be changed.
According to Judge Weinstein, when the law is clear,
a district court judge has a duty to apply it, but not to do so
silently.7 And silent he has not been, particularly about
criminal sentencing. Statutes that require the imposition of
a mandatory minimum sentence have been among the
most consistent targets of his ire, but so, for many years,
were the guidelines.8 For example, within a lengthy opinion
in which he imposed the statutorily required sentence for
drug offenses, Judge Weinstein reviewed the purposes of
punishment, noted the history of the community from
which the defendants came, and warned that mandatory
minimum sentencing “impose[s] grave costs not only on
the punished but on the moral credibility upon which our
system of criminal justice depends.”9 In another case, in
which he imposed the statutorily required sentence for
possession of a gun in connection with a violent crime, he
decried the unavailability of alternatives to incarceration for
those “trapped in a gang culture, and condemned to a life of
poverty and probable crime.”10 In yet another case, in which
he was required to impose a steep sentencing enhancement
under the then mandatory guidelines, he asked whether
“under the blindfold, does justice weep” for the result?11
Such hortatory language in the context of a district court
opinion is not typical. Although appellate judges have long
written concurrences or dissents urging changes in the
law,12 it is far less common for district court judges to do so.
But other district court judges have followed Judge Weinstein’s lead in recent years, joining him in calling upon
Congress, prosecutors, and judges to reevaluate charging
and sentencing policies. For example, Judge John Gleeson
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued numerous “Weinstein-style” opinions before
his retirement, exhorting the country to “deal with—and
not just talk about—our over-incarceration problem,” and
urging “smart, bold choices” about “the lengths of prison
terms we impose” and “the categories of defendants we
routinely”13 put in prison who do not need to be there.14
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Another frequent critic of contemporary sentencing practices, now former Judge Mark Bennett of Iowa, turned one
opinion into a treatise on the Department of Justice’s use of
prior felony informations, which increase the mandatory
minimum penalty in some drug cases, collating his own
research on the Department’s practices and urging judges
to play a role in addressing it.15 In another opinion, he
observed that “in most of the over 1,000 congressionallymandated mandatory minimum sentences that I have
imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have stated on the
record that they were unjust and too harsh.”16 Judge Nancy
Gertner of Massachusetts, before her retirement, wrote
numerous opinions criticizing sentencing policy and what
she described as the “significant downside to what has been
called the American experiment in mass incarceration.”17
She suggested that courts could not be complacent, but
would soon have to consider the possibility that mandatory
minimum sentencing may have disrupted lives and communities without necessarily achieving any significant
deterrence benefit.18 These three judges have been among
the most vocal and consistent advocates for sentencing
reform, but a significant number of other district court
judges have also expressed dissatisfaction with the sentencing status quo, including in the pages of their judicial
opinions and decisions delivered from the bench.19
III. Extrajudicial Speech

Judge Weinstein also has spoken and written frequently in
extrajudicial fora about the need for reforms to the criminal
justice system. Former law professor that he is, he has
written extensive law review articles sharing his candid
assessments of sentencing policy. But he has also written
for popular and professional audiences.20 For example, in
an op-ed in the New York Times published in 1993, he called
for a national commission to reexamine drug policy, characterizing the extant regime as “self-defeating.”21 Although
he acknowledged the complexity of the issue, Judge Weinstein wrote that “unthinking acceptance of the current
policy is unreasonable.”22 In another article, he called
mandatory minimum sentencing a kind of “cannibalism,”
consuming the lives of many “young people, particularly in
minority communities.”23
This kind of open engagement with public policy issues
outside of the courtroom also is not typical for district court
judges. But here, too, Judge Weinstein’s influence may be
seen in the willingness of other judges to express their
policy views outside of Judicial Conference reports or testimony before Congress, the more traditional fora for raising concerns about the wisdom or administration of the
criminal laws. For example, in the past decade, Judge Jed
Rakoff of the Southern District of New York has repeatedly
spoken out about “mass incarceration,” including in
a speech at Harvard Law School 24 and in an essay in the
New York Review of Books,25 observing that judges have
a “special duty to be heard on this issue.” Judge Bennett of
Iowa has written extensively about the need to reform
sentencing laws, including in an essay published in The
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Nation,26 and granted numerous interviews to journalists,27 noting that he was departing from federal judges’
“longstanding culture of not speaking out on issues of
public concern” because of the “daily grist” of what he saw
as unjust mandatory minimum sentences.28 Judge Stefan
Underhill of Connecticut, in a New York Times op-ed,29
called for a mechanism for judges to reevaluate the sentences they imposed years earlier. These are but a few
examples of district court judges leveraging their official
position to reach various audiences to advocate changes in
sentencing and related areas.30
IV. Supervisory Authority

Finally, Judge Weinstein has been a leader in using the
district court’s supervisory authority to innovate in the
realm of criminal sentencing. Before the guidelines governed, he and his fellow judges in the Eastern District of
New York regularly conferred with one another on sentencing in an effort to achieve consistency.31 During the
mandatory guidelines era, he not only regularly found bases
for a downward departure based on extraordinary circumstances,32 but also employed the so-called Fatico33 hearing
to decide disputed facts key to sentencing.34 After Booker
rendered the guidelines advisory only, Judge Weinstein
resurrected his pre-guidelines practice of convening panels
of judges to consider the appropriate sentence in individual
cases.35 As described in an article by the editors of this
symposium, he later imposed upon himself a requirement
that he issue a detailed statement of reasons for every
sentence so that he could track his own consistency and
render his decision making transparent to others.36
Judge Weinstein also spearheaded the development of
a special sentencing program for youthful offenders in his
district that enabled them to reduce or avoid custodial
sentences.37 Similar programs, including diversionary
programs for drug-addicted defendants, have since been
adopted in many districts around the country.38 These
programs often were instigated by district court judges39
who, like Judge Weinstein, were not content to wait for
Congress or the Sentencing Commission to create more
alternatives to incarceration. As Judge Underhill of Connecticut remarked of his efforts to set up such a program in
his court, “I had been a judge long enough that I had
become frustrated with the revolving door.”40 Judge
Weinstein has in turn championed these programs in the
pages of his judicial opinions 41 and urged their expansion
to make them available even to violent offenders.42
V. Consistency with the Judicial Role

Judge Weinstein has established through his actions
a forceful example for how judges can use their position to
advocate and effect criminal sentencing reform. And
although no one will ever match him in this role, he is not
alone. As others consider following in his footsteps, they
might do well to consult another aspect of Judge Weinstein’s scholarship, in which he has turned his critical lens
inward and examined whether this work is consistent with
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the judicial role. He has asked not only whether such
activity is permissible, but also whether it is ethically
required. His answer to both questions is “yes.”
Judge Weinstein acknowledges that some may perceive
a tension between the image of “blindfolded” justice that
decorates many courthouses and judges’ speaking out on
matters of public policy.43 To that end, he offers some
concrete guidance for other judges to minimize concerns
about partiality. For example, he suggests that writing is
generally preferable to speaking and that judges exercise
caution before granting interviews to broadcast media—lest
the judge’s remarks be taken out of context. When speaking, he suggests that neutral settings such as law schools or
bar associations are best. And whether writing or speaking,
he opines that “[s]ome degree of sophistication of knowledge and objective scholarship should be shown, so it is
clear that uninformed prejudice is not at work.”44 The rest,
he suggests, can be addressed through tone—which cannot
be reduced to a particular formula but is entrusted to the
judge’s wisdom and discretion.
Even within these constraints, Judge Weinstein
argues, judges are uniquely positioned to bring perceived
injustices to others’ attention and must. That is particularly so for district court judges who deal with “real people and [see] the impacts of law on those people.”45 He
writes: “Where the law is inadequate or perverse, we
report our observations to those with power to lead: the
public, the legislature, and the appellate courts.”46
According to Judge Weinstein, this reporting can be done
in the pages of judicial opinions, where “it is appropriate
for the trial judge to outline opposing views and state
preferences he or she does not feel free to follow.”47 It
also can be done in the context of a lecture, article, or
book “that could advance the ongoing national debate on
current issues.”48 Judge Weinstein acknowledges that this
affirmative duty is not well defined and emanates foremost from a judge’s sense of self-accountability. “While I
follow federal rules on judicial ethics scrupulously,” he
has written, “I am less concerned with discipline imposed
by others than I am with our individual self-government.”49 He adds that the question is not “What will
others make me do?” but rather “What shall I do?”50
And that is an appropriate question to end on, for it is
the challenge Judge Weinstein poses to his fellow judges as
he leaves the bench after fifty-three years of service. What
will they do when they perceive injustice in the system they
are called upon to administer? Will they report it to others
and, if so, how? Have they fully explored the limits of their
supervisory authority to take corrective action, on their own
or with their fellow judges? Few will be as creative, prolific,
or persuasive as Judge Weinstein has been. But he leaves
behind a fully articulated vision of a district court judge who
refuses to accept that the role necessarily entails passively
applying rules set by others. Judge Weinstein’s legacy thus
includes not only his many groundbreaking judicial opinions, procedures, and scholarly writings, but also the
example he has set for other district court judges in

thinking carefully about the kind of judge they want to be
given the limits and possibilities that accompany their
position.
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